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Abstract of
THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND AN INTERNATIONAL SEABED REGIME
Progress is steadily increasing toward developing the
natural resources of the seabed as technological advances
create both the ability and, demand for their exploitation.
Concomitantly, reliance of the United States upon its naval
forces for national security is increasing the development
and use of sea based weapons systems for the future. These
expanding uses of the ocean are creating the need for a new,
world wide system- of order to avoid the inevltable clash of
conflicting interests in the sea, both commercial and military.
With the advent of an international regime concerned with the
resources of the seabed now becoming discernable, this paper
examines 'the form which such a regime seems to be taking along
with its impact upon naval operations. Although this evolving
change to the traditional law of the sea will influence naval
planning, it is not viewed as an intolerable incumbrance and
it is to the Navy's advantage to actively participate in the
regime's formation and operation. Recommendations are made
relative to the policing activities requisite for the regime
in order to eliminate the tendency for tasking naval units for
such uses.
ii
PREFACE
The purpose of this paper is to meet the joint require-
ments of the U.S. Naval War College and the Master of Marine
Affairs Program of the University of Rhode Island.
The paper proposes to briefly outline the Navy's general
role as one element of this nation's overall seapower. The
expanding sources of conflicting interest in uses of the sea
are examined along with the barely visible form which debates
are presently giving toward the creation of an international
regime for the peaceful exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil, located be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction. Naval adjustment
to the requirements expected to derive from new aspects of the
evolvtng changes to present law of the sea are analyzed and
recommendations are drawn in order to preclude naval involve-
ment as a policing agency for such a regime.
It should be emphasized that developments in this partic-
ular field are of relatively recent emergence, primarily rec-
ognized only since the Law of the Sea conferences held at Ge-
neva in 1958. Despite this aspect there is a proliferation
of source materials regarding the increased emphasis upon sea
resource development, largely centering around legal theory
and commercial technological-scientific applications. Only
limited discussion exists relating specifically to the interfaqe
iii
between the Navy and an internutional agency controlling the
seabed. Coupled with this fact is the highly political nature
of achieving the difficult correllation between the theoretical
approach and the realities of the existing world which defy
clear definition.
The author has therefore taken the libert~ of considerable
deductive reasoning, backing his conclusions where possible by
reference to the more recent writings of persons possessing
greater learned experience and academic polish than his own.
Grateful acknowledgement is accorded to_Professor Daniel
Wilkes of the University of Rhode Island for his patient coun-
seling and helpful guidance in developing this paper.
iv
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5 NAVY AND AN INfERNATIONAL SEABED REGIMETHE U. •
CHAPT&R I
INTRODUCTION
What are the implications for the U. S. Navy of an inter-
national regime controlling the deep seabed? Would such a
regime serve to restrict or enhance naval operations which
have traditionally taken place under the concept of freedom
of the seas? What benefits might accrue to the Navy from such
a regime? What role will the Navy have in respect to the re-
gime?
These questions are addressed in this study along with
an examination of what the present concepts for the interna-
tional regime appear to be, based upon the proposals now under
consideration by United Nations officials. Over the last two
years increasing impetus has been given toward establishing
the regime. Indeed, the United States has now taken the po-
sition that all necessary steps for achieving world wide ac-
ceptance of the regime's make up and function should be com-
pleted by 1973.'
National Goals of the United States. The world is dis-
cernably entering a new phase of development in this last third
of the twentieth century. Bipolar relationships between East
and West which developed at mid-century have been supplanted
by the political impact of newly emerged nations comprising
1
the "Third World". Despite increased capabilities in air trans-
portation, the seas still remain the primary mode of moving
trade between most nations. Technological advances are open-
ing new undersea frontiers previously not expected, as resources
become attainable from the ocean depths. Therefore, seapower
will assume even greater significance than it ~as in the past.
As an integral part of this nation's seapower, its naval strength
and the lattitude to employ it -- will serve to enable the
United States to continue a leading role in the future.
In developing an analysis of the Navy'~ role and how an
evolving regime for controlling the deep seabed may affect fu-
ture naval strategy, it is necessary first to determine what
the national goals of our nation will be. For the United States,
determination of national goals tends to be somewhat illusory
in that for a government such as ours, policy must encompass
a concensus derived from a broad section of highly diverse pub-
lic will which itself is constantly changing in attitude and
interest. This problem of changing will has been dramatically
emphasized by the reactions of the American people over the
past few years toward the military involvement in South East
Asia.
For the 1970's and beyond, however, the clearest pattern
upon which we can base a blue print of U.S. national policy
is the "Nixon Doctrine", first mentioned
_. in JUly 1969 during
a news conference at Guam and later more fUlly articulated in
2
the President's report to Congress on February 18, 1970. 2
Without delving deeply into all the facets of that report,
it should suffice to note that the present leaders of the
nation are attempting to plot less a role of dominance as
one of partnership in concert with other nations and on a
more co-equal basis than in the past. This is particularly
so in the military sphere, for as President Nixon stated:
"Its central thesis is that the United States will
participate in the defense and development of al-
lies and friends, but that America cannot -- and
will not -- conceive all plans, design all the pro-
grams, execute all the decisions and undertake3allthe defense-of the free nations of th~-world."
Over and over again his report emphasizes the future role to
be one of sharing responsibility and placing the importance
of self-help by the nations of the world themselves toward
shaping their own destinies and defense, without American
manpower.
The Navy's Role. At the same time, the Nixon Doctrine
places increased emphasis upon maintaining a viable defense
system of our own. Although the President singles out no par-
ticular mode of this strength, the lessons of history clearly
dictate that sea forces of the U. S. Navy must play an impor-
tant part. 4 For in the event of hostilities, the Navy must
have the " ••• ability to maintain by force an even, uninter-
rupted trade over the seas and to deny that ability to the
enemy. ,,5
While implementing its role of partnership, the United
3
States cannot avoid the fact of its leading position among the
free world nations by virtue of its advanced state of resources
and industrial-Military-economic capabilities. While seeking
to be a partner we will necessarily be a dominant one and this
factor will demand utmost talents for the implementors to over-
come the tragic mistakes of the past which led to accusations
- - -
of "imperialism" when Quixotic motives of assistance were ac-
tually our goals. For example, although the United States has
never sought to be a colonial power, the aftermath of World
War II has placed us in the position of res~~nsibility for ad-
ministering the last remaining Trust Territories in the Pacific
Ocean. Particularly in the emerging nations of the Third
World, American economic ties aimed at their development are
frequently denounced as imperialistic. Despite our good in-
tentions, our actions have in fact frequently lent inaqvertant
credence to such criticism through our insistence to pursue
programs which the people were not yet ready to accept, whether
they wanted them or not. Attempts to plant democracy in South-
east Asia exemplify perhaps the most flagrant mistakes of this
kind.
One factor Which assistance through partnership will en-
tail is a lessening of military involvement through standing
armies and air forces on foreign s011s. Already we are wit-
nessing the relinquishment of overseas bases. Increasing
- -
thought is being directed toward withdrawal of U. S. nuclear
Soviet Russia and Communist
fears of a pre-emptive strike
Japan, Korea and Okinawa as well as
6
force reductions in Europe.
weaponry from the peripheries of
China in order to mitigate their
by the United States. Solid planning is evident for the re-
duction of bases and forces in the Far East such as Vietnam,
discussions of future NATO
With this retrenchment, dependence of the nation will in-
crease upon its seapower to ensure programs vital to its in-
terests are not thwarted.? As Professor W. T. Burke recently
phrased it:
" ••• states have continually resorted to the sea
in many ways for promoting power objectives.
Traditionally, the movement of ships, military
and private, has been the chief form of ex-
ploiting the sea for power purposes, and states
have engaged in frequent power struggles to pre ... ·:-'
serve or acquire conteol over the ocean or stra-
-tegic parts of it ••• "
Those who understand the insights provided by Alfred Thayer
Mahan more than three generations ago will find his teachings
regarding the seas -- and those who control them -- will have
continuing relevance upon the future importance of the navies
of the world. 9 Although Mahan was writing in an entirely dif-
ferent era of ships, weapons and world political environment,
the basic premises upon which he demonstrated a nation's de-
pendence upon the seas are DO less important today. It is
already recognized that Russia is following Mahan's precepts
on the influence of sea-power through its expanding maritime
and naval strength. 10
It should be clear that the United States must and will
place continued emphasis u~on maintaining its own naval strength.
The nuclear deterrent "triad" involving polaris and Poseidon
submarines deployed ocean wide to bolster the land based stra-
tegic missile and aircraft nuclear delivery systems of the na-
tion are commonly acce~ted by most Americans as essential to
the national interest. Integrally tied to this triad are the
conventional naval forces involving aircraft carriers and sur-
face combatants as well as submarines which can assure the
maintenance of open commercial sea lanes th~~ughout the world. 11
To be sure, the modern navy is no longer limited to its previ-
ous role of ocean oriented usefulness since sea based air and
missile power now is capable of extending deep into any land
mass on earth. 12
Naval forces are uniquely fitted to augment the overall
seapower of the nation due to the physical properties of the
three-dimensional environment in which they operate. Mobility
is one of the most important factors and closely related to
this is the element of concealment, particularly for submarine
forces. However, these advantages acc~ue to a potential enemy
as well. The submarine threat posed by the Russian Navy gen-
erates a most defi it h 11nee a enge to protect our merchant and
naval fleets. While the sea has ro fered a protective buffer
to keep hostilities off our land i n the past, the advent of
missile-armed submarines' ak bm es a solute control of the ocean
6
depths vitally important in the future.
The U. S. Navy, in addition to providing a strategic ele-
ment of the deterrent triad, will seek to expand its defensive
capabilities to ensure the security of our shores from attack
by sea. Improved surveillance systems will be required to
counter the Soviet undersea threat. This in turn will entail
increased knowledge and use of the seabed as a base for ex-
tending information collection systems. The "Man in the Sea"
program will encompass increased use of the seabed as support-
ing forces for more conventional naval operations move into
the ocean depths. Eventual use of the sea for storage of mili-
tary supplies is equally as 11kely.13
An Expanding Frontier Under the Sea. In recent years in-
creased knowledge and technology have permitted greater exploi-
tation of the resources lying under the seas. As one of the
most industrially advanced nations, the United States already
rece1ves large quantities of petroleum and other mineral prod-
ucts from the ocean depths. At the present time offshore min-
eral production approaches five billion dollars annually in
value. or this most is from petroleum although iron ore, sul-
phur, beach sands, tin and other minerals are extensively mined.1~
New potentials are continually being found for resources which
will compete with those on land for extraction and use. Only
in an envtronment of world peace will the development of ocean
resources be possible.
7
It should therefore be clearly understood that the Nixon
Doctrine will encompass an increasing interest of this nation
in the sea and our capability of exerting a military presence
upon that sea. It should be equally clear that the United
States will have a vital interest in any measures which involve
the exploitation and the control of such exploitation of re~.·
sources in and under the sea.
While acknowledging that tactical employment of naval
weapons and forces will undergo constant and wide-ranging
changes in the near and distant future, it ~~ not the intent
here to examine what forms these changes will take. Rather,
the intent is to point out that the sea plays a key role af~
fecting whether the United States can achieve its national
goals under the Nixon Doctrine. As such the strategic impor-
tance of its Navy's role cannot be overlooked. At the same
time, while all nations seek to embrace the natural resources
of the sea -- the Navy has a vital interest in how any inter-
national controls may affect its operations on that sea.
8
CHAPTER II
THE NAVY, THE REGIME AND INTERACTIONS OF INTEREST
Interactions of interest will be increasingly evident as
man pushes further into using the sea, an area which has a-
bounded with absolute freedom for so many centuries. Yet,
has freedom of the sea actually been totally free? There have
been many restrictions placed upon the so-called freedom of
the seas. Some restrictions have grown from custom while others
have been created by edict mutually agreed ~pon by many sover-
eign states. While the United States proclaims only a three
mile territorial sea, it has passed laws and regulations pro-
hibiting foreign vessels from fishing in its "exclusive" fish-
eries area which extends to the twelve mile limit of the con-
tiguous zone -- part of the high seas. The Fisheries Conven-
tion of the North Pacific Ocean invokes the abstention prin-
ciple whereby foreign fishermen agree not to take certain species
indigenous to American waters such as salmon, halibut and her-
ring in specified areas of the high seas.'
The sum total, then, is that in the international law
sense, freedom itself has long been limited by certain con-
straints in order that its benefits may be assured for the
maximum good of everyone. Thus we find such things as the In-
ternational R_ules of the Road which bind ships t o certain ac-
tions of navigation in ~rder th t tha ey -- and other ships
9
may travel in safety with at least a minimum danger of inter-
ference. Even the sovereignty of nations over their own ter-
ritorial waters is not absolute in that the right of innocent
passage assures ships from other nations to transit through
them in pursuit of world commerce.
Increasing Interactions in the Sea. As we enter an era
of technology which makes possible the access to vast resources
from the sea, what anyone nation may seek to accomplish is
more and more likely to impinge upon another nation. Law mak-
ers, writers and thinkers are delving into ~ new and untried
arena upon which to base their logic. The seabed, by providing
vast opportunities for overlapping interests which could breed
conflict, offers great challenge for developing the pattern of
new international rules and the forum which will have to im-
plement them.
Since World War II the use of the ocean depths as a me-
dium for nuclear deterrence by missile-armed submarines has
posed unlimited problems of interaction for the opposing super
powers. How can a nation seek to assure its own self preser-
vation from possible obliteration through attack from under
the sea without going under the sea with opposing forces it-
self? It is postulated that through the Soviet submarine re-
sponse to such a threat, the resulting interaction may well
be one of stabilization -- a factor which can only be judged
in the long view of history.2 So long as the use of such
10
forces does not come into play, this stabilization ~ill be
judged as contributing to the maintenance of ~orld peace, the
seemingly only alternative to global destruction. Similarly,
as naval forces roam the surface of the seas -- and the skies
above them __ conflicting interactions will continually result
since obviously two fleets cannot operate in t~e same waters
without accommodation with each other. So long as neither
side is bent on pushing tensions to the extreme, this too
could result in a stabilizing, standoff condition.
Commercial Enterprises. A factor which is far more likely
to raise real conflicts of interaction arises from the commer-
cial enterprises which will take place in the deep sea and the
various nations' attempts to accommodate their national secur-
ity interests around such enterprises. As commercial exploi-
tation moves from national jurisdiction into the international
arena, even the most orderly steps taken by these activities
will affect the operations of other entrepreneurs as well as
the purely military functions of the world's navies.
Seabed exploitation operations by their very nature will
necessitate use of the water column above. This will serve
to limit the free use of these waters by surface and subsur-
face units not connected with such exploitation activities.
For instance, it is expected that construction of some form
of rigid, Phy:ical appar~tus at least of a temporary nature
will usually be required on the ocean bottom at the locus of
11
exploitation. Above this will likely be a means of marking
the point, whether by rigid construction such as a tower, or
less rigid yet physically present as with a tethered buoy or
floating platform. Even where rigid installations are not
required the means of conveying resources to the surface will
necessarily interact upon water column use whether it involves
an underwater elevator, cable, suction hose hoist, or a free
acting sUbmersible.
Accommodation of Interactions. Just as naval forces will
need to seek accommodation around such impe~fments to sea nav-
igation, the entrepreneur himself will be concerned that his
rigs not be endangered from inadvertant damage or loss through
collision with other sea users.
An international regime is perhaps the only means of lim-
iting such contradictory interactions without resort to force
which would in reality be total anarchy in the sea. The his-
toric example of colonial development experienced from the
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries emphasizes how conflicting
interests inevitably have led to war. Even the more recent
development of America's western frontier witnessed the use of
force over the conflicting interests between such varied enter-
prises as sheep and cattle growers, land and railroad devel-
opers, to name but a few. Only through the establishment of
a legitimate system of law and order can avoidance of force
be assured as conflicting interests converge.
12
Exchange of information at least as to location of oper-
ations would lessen the possibility of conflict. Certainly
any international scheme of control would require prior notice
such as informaticn to other mariners alerting them to the
locality and extent of operations likely to affect others on
or under the sea. Further, the elemer-ts of safety at sea might
be greatly enhanced through some stardard means becoming re-
quired for local, on-scene warning devices to alert other users
of the sea to hazards which may exist in the vicinity of exploi-
tation enterprises. Already a safety zone of 500 meters is
provided for such rigs,3 however no universal system of warning
has been established.
As to the implications involving U.S. naval operations
on and under the seas t there can be little doubt that as more
activities develop for the exploitation of natural resources
within the world's oceans, their impact will greatly affect
both tactical and strategic deployments of sea forces through
the inevitability of interaction of interests. As these inter-
actions develop the national interest of the United States
will be to ensure their resolution through peaceful means if
at all possible. For this reason the U.S. Navy must retain
an active role in formulating the nation's decision on what
form international controls should eventually take in order
to avoid as far as possible any potential conflicts between
commercial and naval activities in the depths of the sea.
13
For, according to William T. Burke:
" ••• the protection of comnon interest calls for
conti~ued appraisal and study, by all partici-
pants but particularly by the nation-state, of
the process of interaption, claim and decision
involving the ocean."'"
14
CHAPTER III
THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL REGIME
"An oceanic issue of primary importance before
the worlds' nations is that of the legal status
of the seabed and deep ocean floor."'
The prospects for creating an interna~ion~l seabed .regime
and the arguments in favor of it and in opposition to it are
beyond the intent of the present study. The purpose here is
rather to examine what impact such a regime might hold for na-
val interests in the future. For this it m~y be helpful to
outline the general form which the agency is taking, based up-
on current debate within the United Nations.
Recent Evolution. It has only been in recent years that
consideration for controlling activities of the seabed began.
In December 1967 the United Nations established a legal work-
ing group entitled the "Ad Hoc Committee To Study The Peaceful
.
Uses or The Sea-Bed And The Ocean Floor Beyond The Limits or
National Jurisdiction."2 Within this group, early agreement
was reached on the principal that the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction should not be SUbject to appropriation, but that
a distinction should be made allowing exploitation which would
not serve as a basis for claims of national sovereignty over
the seabed.
The following year, a more permanent committee of the
same name (Without "Ad Hoell in its title) was established by
1,
the General Assembly as a result of the Ad Hoc Committee's
work. The new committee was assigned specific questions to
be examined relative to the establishment of machinery for
promoting cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of
seabed and subsoil resources. So it has only been during the
years 1969 and 1970 that this committee has st~died the_myriad
problems of seeking agreement among its forty-two members.
Problems in Achievement. In the committee's annual report
to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in October
1970, only very general principles are disc~rnable.3 Except
for acknowledging that something must be done, there is little
agreement upon what form should be pursued. For instance there
is a basic question of the relationship between machinery and
a regime itself: some members of the committee hold that a re-
gime would imply machinery as necessary to I1gi ve effect to the
principles and standards of the regime and regulate their prin-
cipal apPlication. 114 Other members feel no machinery need be
implied -- that the principles of a regime once agreed upon
would then generate the form of such machinery.
Types of international machinery considered by the com-
mittee further exemplify the problems of finding agreement.
Four main types were studied in detail: one which calls merely
for exchange of information and preparation of studies; one
for registration and licensing; one possessing intermediate
powers; and one having comprehensive powers. 5 The latter is
16
perhaps the most practical from the standpoint of achieving
the aims of such a regime.
Another problem confusing the issue comes from the less
developed nations who express fear that the more technically
developed nations would dominate any controls envisaged for
a supranational authority. This feeling pervades theirap~'
proach toward solving the basic issues while at the same time
the more developed nations seek to ensure the less developed
nations will receive the benefit of revenues derived from 0-
cean resources.
To be sure, there is not even a clear definition yet upon
how far national jurisdiction is permitted upon the seabed.
Unlike the territorial waters which nations have arbitrarily
established as linear distances from their shores, the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf designated the limit
of national seabed control as extending to the 200 meter depth
which in many cases lies beyond the territorial waters and un-
der the high seas. However, the Convention went on to allow
for even greater depths which may become capable of exploita-
tion. This wording opened two additional problems which were
unforeseen at the time for determining an absolute boundary:
the questions of what constitutes exploitability and how far
from shore the principle of adjacency should extend. Lacking
a clear definition to these two questions effectively thwarts
progress toward achieving delineaticn of where an international
17
regime would be empowered to act. This aspect of the present
Law of the Sea also bears heavily upon any plans the Navy may
develop toward its use of the seabed as an operating base.
Acknowledging that arms control agreements will probably en-
compass the entire sea, some permitted forms of military uses
of the sea and its floor may differ significantly under the
evolving law depending upon whether they will be under national
or international jurisdiction. Regarding military uses:
n ••• the recommended framework does not subject
military uses to any control or regulation;
they will be governed by existing principles
of international law and any arms control a-
greements that may be reached."6
Progress Toward Achievement. In May 1970, the United states
offered a solution to the problems of exploitability and adja-
cency by calling upon all nations to renounce claims beyond the
200 meter depth. 7 This proposal has not received wide accept-
ance, especially from commercial interests in this country who
see this as potentially giving away enormous sources of revenue
8from the continental shelves surrounding the United States.
Despite these problems which hover menacingly in the back-
ground there are broad areas in which some general principles
have permeated most of the discussions regarding a seabed re-
gime from the beginning: avoidance of outright appropriation
of the seabed or its resources by any state or by any inter-
national body; avoidance of interference among and between the
various enterprises undertaken either upon or within the ocean
18
floors; prevention and control of pollution along with conser-
vation of the sea's resources; and the assurance that benefits
derived from the seabed resources be shared in some manner with
all nations. especially developing or landlocked countries
lacking access or exploitation capabilities.
_ The United States' Proposal. There were numerous draft
resolutions studied at the committee's August 1970 meeting on
what general principles should apply to the international re-
gime. However, the United States submitted a working paper in
the form of a draft treaty proposal which, though far from
overcoming the lack of agreement in many areas, provides per-
haps the best general indication of what form a regime may e-
ventually take.
~he United States working paper encompasses the establish-
ment of an International Seabed Resource Authority. Accompanying
this would be the creation of the International Seabed Area as
the
..... common heritage of all mankind ••• (consisting)
••• of the seabed and subsoil of the high seas sea-
ward of the 200 meter isoba~h a~j~cent to the
coast of continents and islands."'!
A geographic transition zone would be provided by the Inter-
national Trusteeship Area of some agreed upon width, seaward
from the 200 meter depth limits of national jurisdiction to
an outer boundary generally suggested as the break between
the continental slope and the continental margin. The basic
19
intent here would be to secure to the coastal power the right
to administer controls near its area of geographic interest
in behalf of the international regime. Beyond the Trustee-
ship Area, the regime would assume management of controls.
Regime Status Under International Law. One basic premise
of the U. S. proposal is that the establishment of the inter-
national authority should provide for a juridical personality,
that is it would have legal capacity, privilege and immunity
such as provided for the United Nations organization. The au-
thority would have an active role engaged in_controlling sea-
bed operations beyond national jurisdiction rather than merely
recording the activities of various exploitive undertakings.
As envisioned by the proposal this authority would con-
sist of a General Assembly of delegates from all contracting
nations, a Council consisting of twenty-four designated or
elected delegates and a Tribunal to which disputes or advice
on interpretive measures could be referred. The latter would
consist of internationally appointed jurists who would serve
the day-to-day functions of an international court relating
specifically to problems of the seabed regime. Supportive
commissions would perform the technical functions specified
by the convention and be composed of appointed personnel with
"suitable qualifications and experience in seabed resources
management, ~aritime sa~ety, ocean and marine engineering,
••• mining and mineral technology••• operation of marine instal-"
lations, equipment and devices ••• ,,10 A Secretatiat ~ould be
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formed on the model of the United Nations Organization. The
authority could be a part of the U. N. or a completely separate
body.
Aims of the Regime. The basic premise of the U. S. pro-
posal is that the International Seabed Resource Authority would
engage in licensing the exploration and exploitation enterprises
of a commercial nature which:
"have as their principal or ultimate purpose
the discovery or appraisal, and exploitation,
of mineral deposits ••• "11
Further, provision is made for exploiting ltving resources of
the seabed in accordance with conservation measures; creation
of protective rules against pollution; the promotion of scien-
tific rese~rch; and the designation of specific areas as marine
parks and preserves having "unusual educational, scientific or
recre~tional value. 1I 12
It is readily apparent from the wording of the working
paper that purely military ventures would come exclusively out-
side the jurisdiction of such an authority, although it is
pointed out that arms agreements such as the emplacement of
strategic weapons of mass destruction would COme under the pur-
view of arms control limitations separate from but certainly
of interest to the regime.
If the Navy were to engage in commercial or non-defense
oriented activities on the ocean floor, there is every reason
to believe it would follow the same licensing procedures as
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any other such enterprise. Here again, the basic aim of the
United States should be interpreted as allowing for military
uses of the seabed. These uses would not be sUbject to the
regime's jurisdiction so long as they relate to defensive or
scientific purposes which will promote world peace.
In view of historic events since World War II and the
evolution of the "Cold War" despite the creation of the United
Nations, it seems likely that only if defensive military uses
of the sea and ocean floor are permitted will political real-
ities in the family of nations ever allow creation of an inter-
national regime.
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CHAPTER IV
NAVAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE REGIME
Nowhere else on earth does there seem to be a greater
need for clear definition and outline to resolve conflicting
interactions of interest than under the high seas. In at-
tempting to accommodate the traditional, yet already limited
freedom of the seas concept, some further infringement upon
this freedom seems virtually inevitable in the expanding ex-
ploration and exploitation of the underlying seabed. If this
were merely to involve an accommodation of business interests
alone, the issues might be capable of easy resolution through
knowledgeable lawyers and shrewd bargaining between commercial
representatives. But in addition to vast mineral resources,
the potential means of assuring a nation's survival also lie
under the sea.
The development of nuclear powered submarine fleets armed
with weapons capable of incalculable destruction upon an enemy
has increased the importance of the sea in national security,
particularly for the major world powers. It is therefore im-
perative that the U. S. Navy and other national planners pro-
ceed cautiously, examining in every detail the ramifications
an international seabed regime might hold relative to the de-
fensive capabilities of this country.
The Sea as a Different Legal Environment. The seas and
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their floors offer a far wider area for the conflicts of in-
teraction than are found on land. For example, on the land
areas of the world armies were once free to roam wherever their·
power permitted. Under the nation-state concept and with the
evolution of laws in more modern times, the armies of the world
have become constrained to remain within thei~ own territorial
boundaries unless nations choose to wage aggression against
their neighbors. This concept of territorial sovereignty and
integrity was even extended into the air overlying nations once
the impact of the aviation age came to be r~alized.
Not so, however, with the oceans which have been held free
at least in principle since Hugo Grotius outlined the concept
during the seventeenth century. In the present day the fear
of nationalization of the world's oceans, or significant por-
tions of them, is perhaps the most compelling force for seek-
I
ing agreement on controlling measures for exploiting ocean re-
sources while keeping the seas themselves reasonably free. The
trend in recent years has been for nations to expand the pre-
viously accepted three nautical mile limit of the territorial
sea. Already more than forty nations adhere to the twelve mile
line and increasing numbers have extended their jurisdictions
out to 200 miles from their coastlines.' Indications are clear
that others may well follow as the lure of seabed resources be-
comes ever greater.
On the other hand, as long as the seas are free and not
under the domain of any nation there exists the very real pos-
sibility for multiple and conflicting interactions. Consider
such hypothetical factors as an aircraft sweeping its sonic
boom over ~ fishing vessel which has its nets deployed into
the sea along the ocean floor and in turn interfering with a
resource extraction operation on the seabed which is itself
in conflict with subsoil drilling and mining activities -- all
at one geographic point on the earth, involving men and equip-
ments from many different nations!
The principle of "Res Comminus" under which the sea floor
belongs to all mankind and therefore not subject to anyone's
jurisdiction would certainly permit such conflicting interac-
tion at sea. By contrast, land sites have long permitted ap-
propriation, jurisdiction and therefore control which prevents
2such overlapping interests involving resource development.
The counter principle of "Res NUllius" implies belonging
to no one and would therefore at least theoretically permit
establishment of sovereignty over the seas, a condition most
international statesmen are seeking to avoid.) For, as many
writers on the sUbject agree, a land grab of the ocean floors
would not be in the best interests of mankind. Yet as already
shown, some nations have begun to extend their sovereignty in-
to what was previously the high seas. Some writers point out
that even greater progression may extend to the midpoints of
the deep oceans themselves unless the principles of an inter-
national regime can be adopted. Should nations continue to
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expand their territorial waters, it will create a very real
risk of conflicting interests between them which could lead
to war.
Naval Interest in the Sea. It is axiomatic that the Navy's
interests in the sea are many and varied. In general they stem
from the historic fact that where man goes in trade, his prob-
lems, and therefore his military, usually follow. The sea, as
an avenue to world trade, has generated wide applications of
naval power stemming from the special physical properties of
the ocean. These are today manifested in m9-bile based Strike
Air Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare and ocean
surveillance enabling the projection of military power at spe-
cific localities as well as strategic deterrence offered by
both conventional and nuclear weapon systems. 4 These are all
seemingly obvious, yet relating these interests here to a con-
text in which they could be relinquished in deference to inter-
national control would throw an awesome shadow over the tasks
of anyone planning future naval strategy. To identify all of
the potential naval uses of the seas defies even the wildest
imagination. However, of special concern to this study are
three general, yet principle duties of the Navy: to use the
sea as a base for attacks upon land; to transport men and ma-
terials by sea in support of wartime operations; and to deny
such capability to the enemy.' The nuclear deterrence role
of the submarine fleet is included in the first, while nearly
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every other facet of naval strength will contribute to all
three.
It is difficult to determine a dividing point between
patently naval interests in the sea and those which are strictly
commercial in nature. Much of the research and development
overlaps heavily between them. The Navy, whet~er opera~ing a
single ship or mUltiple fleets will require the ability to roam
at will over, on and under the high seas. The conventional
display and use of naval power can range to every conceivable
purpose from supporting military operations_~n land in remote
areas of the world to ensuring that American and Free World
ocean commerce remains unrestricted by any nation which might
otherwise choose to hinder it.
The expanding naval capability of the Soviets, particularly
in their submarine armaments, generates a strong potential chal-
lenge to our Navy.6 This threat is basically two fold~ it
could be employed to hazard sea commerce anywhere in the world
as well as to deliver a nuclear missile attack from under the
sea against the United States or one of its allies.
Countering this dangerous undersea naval threat is a
widely diversified system of weapons and devices employed under
the aegis of Anti-Submarine Warfare. Quite naturally this ASW
capability encompasses ships and aircraft which roam the seas
and skies in search and tracking evolutions.
The Source of Naval-Regime Interaction. Potentially mOr8"
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s1fnificantly affected by international controls over the sea-
bed, however, would be the emplacement of remote sensing de~
vices for the passive detection of submarine craft transiting
the ocean depths. Many of these surveillance systems are clas-
sified and little can be said of them except that they gener-
a1lr consist of acoustic listeners capable of ~etecting _ship's
noises and whose location on the seabed would most desirably
be kept secret from any potential enemy.7
It is mainly in this type of interaction that naval and
commercial factors could easily be expected.~o clash. As more
resources are exploited from the ocean floor, chances increase
that drilling, mining or dredging operations will eventually
take place where such ASW detection networks have been placed.
By the same token, the installation of exploitation equipment
could serve to restrict waters through which surface and under-
sea vessels have been free to maneuver in the past. These two
factors appear to be inevitable.
Impact Upon the Navy. What then of the questions origi-
nally posed regarding the implications of possible restraints
an international seabed regime might hold for the U. S. Navy?
There seems little reason to believe that the Navy -- indeed
all the world's navies -- could not operate effectively in con-
junction With such a regime so long as the regime remains con-
cerned primarily with commercial uses of the seabed. Neither
does it appear that commercial exploitation operations under .
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such a regime need have an overburdening effect that would
serve to alter the future value of naval strengths to fulfill
their nations' security interests.
On the contrary, such a regime could permit all navies a
far more orderly appraisal of existing and planned commercial
enterprises which might potentially hazard or interfere with
their own naval forces. Certainly it would serve both national
as well as regime purposes to have naval representatives on the
regime's staff in order to be alerted to potentially interac-
tive conflicts of interest. Such a working.program need not
obviate a nation's reliance upon secret factors concerning its
own national security. Also this does not imply that commer-
cial enterprises would be restricted from any area of possible
exploitation. Where such activities might encompass an area
already in use, by for instance some passive-defensive device
placed on the ocean floor, immediate steps toward accommodation
could more readily be started.
The U. S. Navy has long been operating under international
constraints on the seas of the world. U. S. naval operations
have consistently honored the territorial waters of other na-
tions. Similarly, the controls imposed upon aviation under the
International Civil Aviation Organization since 19448 have not
hindered the growth in importance of naval aviation as an ex-
tension of United States sea power. The Navy has traditionally
accommodated to civilian economic interest as shown by its
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frequent adjustment of oceanic operation areas and outright
curtailment of maneuvers in deferrence to such enterprises as
fishing, oil exploitation, recreational activities, etc. 9
The implications of a regime for controlling the exploi-
tation of the deep seabed offer little change to the Navy's
capability of national security operations in the future. No
where in the proposed draft treaties, nor in the discussions
surrounding them, has there been an inference that covert mil-
itary efforts of a defensive, peaceful nature would be cur-
10tailed. Although some discussion toward tptal prohibition
of military use was contained in reports of the United Nations
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace from 1966 to 1969,
this aspect has received little focus in subsequent U. N. de-
bate. 11 This is despite the inclusion by Dr. Pardo in the fa-
mous Malta proposal of 1967 to reserve the seabed "exclusively
for peaceful purposes in perpetuity.,,12
It is also recognized that the Soviets have introduced
proposals containing reference to prohibition of military uses
of the sea, however these have been largely propaganda in na-
ture and have not received widespread consideration. Indeed,
the U. S. Congress Foreign Relations Committee in discussing
a draft Treaty on Ocean Space during January 1969 specifically
provided for the continued operation of Polaris submarines and
defensive underwater detection systems. 13 It would appear that
the more likely forum for further study of strictly military
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limitations will come from the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Conferences at Geneva and its related Strategic Arms Limita-
tien Talks at Helsinki and Vienna. Meanwhile, the commercial
aspects of discussion by the U. N. Seabed Committee can pro-
ceed to create an environment conducive to promoting the ex-
ploitation of ocean bottom resources through the international
regime.
Judging from the political realities surrounding creation
of such a body, the main focus of the regime will apparently
be directed toward the orderly development and exploitation
of resources in the commercial sense for the benefit of man-
kind and only minimally indirectly affecting other uses of the
sea. This aims mainly toward avoiding the "land grab ll prac-
tices such as were employed during the colonialization period
of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. 14 Closely tied to
this concept will be the means of taxing the exploitation en-
terprises for the benefit of developing nations.
Strategic implementation of naval forces or devices of a
defensive nature will in no way serve to counter the purposes
of such a regime. It would seem therefore that the Navy has
much to gain from the creation of an international seabed re-
gime. Further, the orderly development of commercial exploi-
tation provided by such agreement would avoid the hazards of
power conflicts which might otherwise develop without such
control.
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An Interaction to Avoid. Although it seems logical that
the navies of the world should be represented within the ad-
ministrative organization of such a controlling body, it should
not be construed that naval forces would be used for the po-
licing activities which might be required for inspection and
enforcement of its regulations. Such a use of naval vessels
- -
would seriously impair their missions relative to defense of
their respective nations. It can therefore be deduced that
all navies would be extremely reluctant to commit any of their
forces to the international regime for such_ftuties.
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CHAPTER V
AN ALTERNATIVE TO NAVAL INVOLVEMENT
In order to avoid the understandable opposition which
would arise from use of the world's navies as enforcement a-
gents and as an alternative to their being expected to meet
such a requirement, the creation of an international ocean
force capable of policing the goals of a seabed regime seems
both desirable and entirely feasible. Senator Claiborne Pell
brought forth such a concept in 1966 when h~_proposed an In-
ternational Sea Patrol for which the United States Coast Guard
1
would serve as the nucleus.
Later, in 1968 Senator Pell carried his idea further in
a draft treaty on "Principles Governing the Activities of
Statei in Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space." Chang-
ing the name to Sea Guard, the draft called for the policing
agency to "maintain and enforce international compliance" with
the principles of the seabed treaty.2
The need for policing adherence by all enterprises to
international measures controlling exploitation of seabed re-
sources is certainly beyond question. Without the protection
such services would prOVide, there would be little purpose in
formUlating rules which could be undermined by unscrupulous
behavior or even inadvertent misadventure due to pOllution or
to extinction-of those resources. The basic premise for a
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regime is to assure order rather than chaos on the ocean floors.
Creating Enforcement Measures. The international ocean
policing activity should of course be multinational in nature.
It could, at least initially, be created from discarded naval
vessels, aircraft and other equipments from nations willing
to contribute them. Or perhaps these equipments could be ap-
propriated through long term financing arrangements since it
is anticipated that the regime will become a self sufficient
activity through revenues obtained from the licensing of com-
mercial ocean enterprises.
In view of the myriad other obstacles the regime would
have to overcome from the beginning, the former suggestion seems
preferable. Certainly the more technologically advanced coun-
tries, who stand to be the most concerned with ocean exploita-
tion, should take the lead in making the equipments available
since the success of the regime will most directly affect the
success of their undersea commercial development programs. The
transfer of equipments might even be closely allied with future
disarmament measures.
Let us examine more closely how such a force could be
composed. The international ocean force would not assume au-
thority to control the territorial waters of any nation nor
the International Trusteeship waters bordering them except as
requested by nations incapable of policing their own areas of
interest.
Economic Factors. Since the force would be strictly of
a policing nature it need not be based upon heavy armaments,
but on capable, seaworthy vessels for patrolling the high seas
in order to monitor registered exploitive operations and to
detect violations of international agreements. As such, the
force would be manned by individuals possessing a wide range
of talents drawn from the naval, merchant and even fishing
fleets of the world who no longer pursue careers in those fields
but still retain man's inexplicable desire to go down to the
sea. Such a force would require uncommon d~dication and total
acceptance of the challenge to work for the benefit of all man-
kind in keeping the seas' resources from falling into ruin
such as has resulted so many times from the uncontrolled exploi-
tation suffered in many regions of the world's land areas.
Regarding the costs, ships operated in a service such as
this certainly would not be as expensive as when they are main-
taining the complicated armaments which apply to modern combat
naval forces. In addition, the force could provide manifold
benefits to all countries through the job opportunities that
would be available for retiring seafarers as well as training
opportunities for the youth of all nations who might wish to
become men of the sea. The trained and experienced manpower
reserve this would provide to the parent nations of these in-
dividuals might permit augmentation of their own naval, mer-
chant or fishing fleets -if situations should arise that require
them.
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Feasibility Factors. Man has traditionally been capable
of cooperation at sea and a force manned by mUltinational crews
should prove workable through the common bond of the sea. For
instance, the world's merchant marines are freqently crewed by
sailors of varying nationalities. Further, the United States
Navy proved the concept of a mUlti-national crew from the Navies
of seven NATO nations during the highly successful cruise of
USS Rickets from July 1964 to December 1965. 3
Modern technology of both Russia and the United States
provides numerous supporting methods which ~ould assist in po-
licing the oceans without the international agency itself hav-
ing to expend large amounts for an exclusive system of its own.
Internationally shared data from orbiting satellite collection
devices such as Nimbus, ESSA, ATB and TIROS should easily be
~
available to policing activities of the regime. Computer de-
rived analysis from a wide variety of sources would permit the
agency to keep abreast of its entire area of interest.
The greatest benefit of all would be the assured status
of commercial investment which presently hangs in question for
developing enterprises in the ocean beyond the limits of clearly
defined national jurisdiction. The orderly process of both ex-
ploration and exploitation would ensure a more reasonable re-
turn to the investors which in turn would enhance all aspects
of developing the resources of the ocean for the use of all
mankind.
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Potential for Future Expansion. The international ocean
force need not necessarily be limited to monitoring seabed
exploitation activities alone. Indeed, in view of the inevi-
tability of interactions arising within the sea, it is quite
conceivable that the regime itself could one day be closely
allied with the other various international ag~ncies and ac-
tivities concerned with ocean services such as fisheries,
weather observation and scientific exploration. Appropriate
personnel working for the international community could be
stationed on the ships, aircraft and floating or land based
stations which could meet the requirements of policing objec-
tives for all such organizations.
Other functional duties which could be assumed by the in-
ternational force include an active role in search and rescue
activities presently performed by coastal states under provi-
sion of the Convention on the High Seas. 5 This service would
certainly be in keeping with the goal of using the ocean's re-
sources for the benefit of all mankind. The humanitarian prin-
ciples of the rescue activities of any state are now provided
to air and sea users of all nations. Augmentation by the in-
ternational ocean force would be a reasonable extension of such
services and might relieve the burden for Some coastal states.
As postUlated earlier, creation of an international ocean
policing force would relieve the naval forces of the world from
an unwanted task which would interfere with their basic missions
3?
of national security. At the same time it would offer one of
the most unique opportunities yet attempted for international
co-operation within the United Nations. It would be fitting
that such an advance for mankind might stem from his operati9ns
on the ocean frontier. For, although the expanding world pop-
ulations live on the land, roughly three quarters of the world
is made up of the sea -- and it 1s from the sea that mankind
may derive the greatest part of his future existence.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing has sought to show that in the foreseeable
future there will be a continuing need for a strong naval pres-
enc~ on the high seas as an expression of Unit~d States .deter-
mination to remain a maritime power. The U. S. Navy will have
an increasing role in implementing United States policy in
support of the Nixon Doctrine which calls for a lessening of
military posture tied to overseas bases.
The flexibility of response and mobility permitted through
naval forces will be in consonance with the "low profile" pos-
ture signalled by the new foreign policy for the last third
of the present century. This policy recognizes the changes
in world political developments that have emerged from World
War II and the sUbsequent Cold War doctrines of the past two
and one-half decades.
The world, is becoming increasingly conscious of the value
to be derived from the ocean's resources. Modern technology
is making possible the exploitation of tremendous riches from
the ocean depths. As mankind moves to the deep ocean frontier,
conflicts of interest will result from the overlapping uses
of its surface, submarine and seabed properties. To prevent
such cor-flicts becoming open war, international agreement is
desirable and necessary to permit the peaceful development of·
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natural resources for the benefit of all mankind.
In order to create order from impending chaos, the United
Nations is examining the framework of an international regime
for controlling the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources in the seabed and its subsoil beyond the limits of
nat~onal jurisdiction. At present these limit~ require_clearer
definition before substantive agreement can be reached upon
the formation of the regime. However, some important princi-
ples have been approved by most nations: there exists an area
of the seabed which must not be sUbject to ~ppropriation by
any state and the benefits of its resources must be reserved
for all mankind.
Contrary to what the concept at first implies, establish-
ment of an international seabed regime will not necessarily
impinge upon naval forces in their roles of safeguarding na-
tional security. Rather than restricting naval operations of
the future, such a regime could enhance them by signalling po-
tential areas of conflict with commercial enterprise, thereby
permitting early accommodation and adjustment.
Present planning for a regime is limited strictly to con-
trol of commercially oriented enterprises which would be li-
censed to find and develop resources under the sea. Measures
designed to limit military uses will be the sUbject of sepa-
rate arms control agreements.
A potential source of trouble for the Navy would be the .
natural tendency to task certain elements with the enforcement
duties which could be expected to evolve from an international
regime. It is suggested that an independent ocean force be
established under the regime itself along with the free ex-
change of mUltiple data gathering services already in use and
yet to be devised by national and international agencies. It
is further suggested that the regime could easily be expanded
to encompass other worldwide activities such as the enforce-
ment of fishing regulations, weather collection and other en-
vironmental services as well as a role in the search and res'·
cue activities presently performed by coastal states through-
out the world.
Manis involvement with man over the centuries on land
has drawn a history of almost continual war. With his last
frontier opening to him under the sea, it is hoped that he
can now learn from the past and create a new road to future
prosperity based upon peace and cooperation whieh an interna-
tional seabed regime could offer.
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Hands (Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1966), pp. 0-9.
The mUlti-national crew experiment was conducted in USS
Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) from July 1964- to December 1965,
consisting of the following composition:
Country Officers M
2
ef
Greece 2
Italy 2 30
Netherlands 1 17
Turkey 1 10
United Kingdom 2 2~
United States 10 16~
West Germany ~ ~
20 3l'"O
4-. Paul E. LaViollette and Sandra E. Seim, "Satellites Capa-
ble of Oceanographic Data Acquisition-A Review," Technical
Report-2l5, U. S. Naval Oceanographic Office (Washington:
U. S. Govt. Print. Off., May 1969). Satellites mentioned·
4-5
5.
have visible and infra red televised surveillance facilities
with data link to earth stations and are capable of use in
ocean policing.
United Nations, General Assembly, International Convention
on the High Seas, A/CONF. 13/t.53, 1958 (New York: 1958),
Article 12:2.
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